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Abstract - In the last years, a lot of new intelligent full-featured 
peripherals that assist information systems have appeared. Those 
peripherals, such as printers, copiers, PDA organizers, web cameras, 
etc. usually have a very fhendly way of configuration and managing 
(via http, ftp or telnet servers) and everyday offer more networked 
services. Their computation, memory and networking capabilities have 
also increased in the last years. Nowadays, many of them are 
comparable to workstations and run over complete operating systems 
such as Linux or Solaris. 
All those factors imply that these devices could represent a real threat 
for the security of information systems. This problem is even worse 
because most of those peripherals have been considered inoffensive 
and not many administrators are aware about their security risks. 
The most representative example is printers, which have been 
traditionally considered totally harmless devices. At present time, this 
idea is difficult to defend because too many security incidents related 
with networked printers have risen in the last years. System and 
security administrators have traditionally focused their efforts in 
fortieing servers and hosts only, but it seems that this view is not 
enough for assuring security nowadays. 
Introduction 
The field of computer security is quite heterogeneous, since many vety different 
circumstances could affect to the security level of an information system. 
Printers, being components of information systems, must also be taken into 
account: Their capabilities have improved considerably and their relevance to 
security has also increased, accordingly. Some printers even use a Sparc CPU 
that runs the Solaris operating system, while others have Linux’s network stack 
implementations. This close similarity with classical computers allows these 
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peripherals a complex functionality, which usually involves higher security 
risks. 
There are numerous incident reports were the abuse of printers have eased or 
even played a mayor role in hacker’s activities. There are incidents due to a 
deficient configuration of these devices (configuration of these peripherals are 
usually worse, because they are considered inoffensive), and also incidents 
provoked by an insecure design or a bad implementation of some service of the 
device (commonly the software implemented is not properly tested and buggy, 
has backdoors, or is simply too old). 
Networked printers are quickly growing in number and complexity. They have 
evolved towards an easier configuration, which in many cases can be done via 
ftp, telnet and http for the sake of user-friendliness and maintenance. In most of 
the cases, the manufacturers of these printers share the false idea that security is 
not an issue at all. This converts the election of the particular telnet/http/ftp 
server into a search for the cheapest and smallest available (in many cases it is 
on the firmware). Obviously, these objectives are clearly opposed to security. 
That explains why security vulnerabilities long ago discovered and patched in 
hosts are usually found in networked printers: the software in this devices has 
not evolved accordingly, suffering from trivial and classical attacks not 
affordable in any other applications. 
This extremely simple and untested software/firmware is only one of the 
reasons that explain this kind of problems. The other common manufkcturer’s 
philosophy is not to make the printers simple and lightweight because of the 
inherent (CPU, hard drive, etc.) limitations but to make them very close to a real 
host, adding a real operating system, a powerful CPU, a full network 
connection, etc. If this is the option chosen by the manufacturer, and more and 
more chose it, it is completely evident how dangerous could be not to take its 
security seriously. 
Even though printers do not usually keep important or sensitive information, 
they can be used for interrupting the proper working of the information system. 
An attacker that gains access to a networked printer could be able of using its 
TCPAP communications to perform several attacks. Since the printer is not a 
regular host, probes coming fiom a network printer might pass unobserved. 
These devices do not usually maintain detailed logs, which makes very difficult 
to trace back hacker’s tracks. 
Typical attacks 
There are two kinds of attack in which a printer can be useful or needed: The 
first class of attacks happens when the intruder exploits security vulnerabilities 
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found in the printer itself (faulty software, badly configured services, etc.) and 
the second one happens when the intruder exploits some printer properties that 
are not specifically someone's mistake (networked printers are excellent idle 
machines in the night). 
The first of these two types of attacks is, by far, the most frequent and easy to 
solve, because in most of the cases, after a vulnerability is reported, the 
manufacturer quickly distributes patches with a solution. The second one is 
more difficult to stop, but there are lots of things the security administrator can 
do to prevent it or to minimize its impact. 
Into the next subsections we will show several examples of how printers can be 
used to develop hacker attacks. These subsections show how an attacker could 
gain root access into certain network printers, obtain other users login/password, 
interrupt the printer regular working and hide himher tracks. 
JETDIRECT vulnerabilities 
The HP JetDirect is a famous device widely used in many organizations. In 
October 2000 multiple vulnerabilities were discovered, which if exploited by a 
hacker could make it inoperative. These vulnerabilities are caused by buffer 
handling problems in the firmware. Furthermore, another bug exits in the 
Jetdirect IP protocol implementation. This error can cause the printer to crash if 
a certain malformed packet is sent to the printer. 
HP has produced a new firmware version that solves this problem, which can be 
downloaded from its web site. However, the vast majority of the administrators 
are not aware of those problems, which implies that there are many Jetdirects 
working with the old firmware version. 
Buffer handling problems are serious menaces to security, but nowadays, 
although constantly appearing in diverse applications, are well known and easy 
to prevent. The discovery of various buffer handling problems in JetDirect's 
firmware reveals a serious lack of security consciousness during its 
development. 
QMS 2060 vulnerability 
This bug enables root access to the printer without any password protection. The 
access to the printer is guaranteed by a user/password file (passwd.ftp), only the 
users specified into this file can access to it. Hfiever  if an attacker tries to login 
with the root login, s h e  will access to the printer independently of the password 
typed. 
The security implications of this bug cannot be bigger; the attacker could do 
what ever she wants with the printer (like obtaining the passwords of other 
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valid users, etc.) and also could perform attacks from the printer hiding all 
hidher tracks. 
QMS customer support started an investigation for determining the grounds of 
the bug and they conclude that is was not a bug but a feature. In order to make 
the root password protected, one has to buy a "security key", a little DB-9 plug, 
which is plugged in the matching connector at the rear of the printer. Only then, 
a root password can be established (obviously, until then establishing a 
password file is totally meaningless). 
This hard to believe bug is nowadays impossible to find in host's application, so 
here we have a clear example of how security was not a point at all in QMS's 
priorities. 
Nashua Tec D445 vulnerabilities 
The D445 Nashua Tec printer contains multiple vulnerabilities that make the 
printer open to several attacks: 
1) It is possible to cause the crash of the authentication cgi, which is 
installed on the printer's HTTP configuration server. This makes also 
possible the execution of arbitrary code. 
The password field (provided by the defhult logon page) is 15 characters 
long, but an intruder with a slightly modified copy of the original form 
will be able to submit many more characters (about 260 will be enough 
to crash) to the cgi and produce a buffer overflow. This could lead, after 
some work, to the execution of arbitrary code. Another unfortunate case 
of badly programmed cgi. 
2) It is possible to use the printer for "ftp bounce attacks". 
The ftp server does not check the type of port in the request (a port 
smaller than 1024 is an administrative port) nor checks the IP address 
used. So an intruder may use the ftp server to port scan some other hosts, 
anonymously abusing &om the PORT flp command. Obviously, no 
modem ftp server allows this ftp bounce attacks, so in this case we have 
met an old buggy software version. 
3) It is possible to cause the printer to stop responding, effectively 
creating a Denial of Service attack by using an ICMP redirect storm 
against the printer communications stack. 
Xerox's DocuColor 4 LP vulnerability 
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Xerox’s DocuColor 4LP printer contains a vulnerability that allows remote 
attackers to cause the printer to stop responding and interrupt its regular 
working. The attack is based on a Denial of Service. 
This attack is particularly easy to perform, because the attacker just needs to 
send a large amount of periods C.’) -around 2000 dots will be enough- in an 
HTTP request to the printer, a remote attacker can cause the printer to stop 
responding to pings and interrupt new and existing printing jobs. An attack that 
no serious web server can afford and which will take much time to correct until 
the administrators apply the patch. 
HP 5M5N vulnerability 
This vulnerability allows an attacker to crash HP 5M or 5N printers just by 
sending a legitimate SNMP (Simple Network Managing Protocol) packet. The 
impact is not only that a person could crash only one printer, but rather that an 
attacker could severely impact printing in a fairly wide area. 
Although Hewlett Packard has fixed the problem, this attack is still possible 
over many HP 5W5N printers, and easy to perform after downloading the 
“npadmin” program fiom the ftp://pasta. penguincomputing.com/pub/prtools. 
HP LaserJet 4M Plus DirectJet vulnerability 
The LaserJet 4M Plus has an interesting security hole that allows anybody to 
sent a postscript document to print, even if the sender IP does not belong to the 
internal network. This printer keeps open the TCP ports 9099 and 91 00 waiting 
for postscript documents to print. In [8] it is possible to find an nmap command 
for scanning networks to find printers with those ports open. When found, a 
simple tool like netcat will be more than enough to abuse thisfeature. 
Although Hewlett Packard has fixed the problem, it is still easy to find those 
open ports waiting for huge postscript documents to print, interrupting other 
previously queued; and wasting paper resources. 
Using printers to idlescan 
After those examples we will see one technique that shows how attackers can 
use printers as idle machines for scanning other networks or machines without 
being traced and even causing, in some cases, legal problems to the security 
administrator of the network in which the printer is connected. 
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This interesting technique showed the dangers of predictable IP and ID packet 
numbering. Although any device with an IP and very low traffk is suitable for 
the use of this technique, printers are particularly adequate. 
The idea is simple, but powerful: The scanning of the host can be conducted 
from the attacker’s machine, using any IP spoofing tool to generate packets that 
have the idle printer IP as its origin address. The scan is performed by sending 
these forged packets to the real target while observing the idle printer. As the 
result of the scan will come back to the printer, it must be under constant 
observation to detect the arrival of an answer. This can be done with the aid of 
predictable IP numbering, just by continuously sending packets to it and 
observing the ID of the returning packet. When the scanned port is open, the 
scanned machine will return an answer to the printer, to which the printer will 
answer with an RST packet thus altering the answering pattern. This can be 
done twice for better accuracy. In this way, printers can be used to collect 
information previous to an attack in a very straightforward and reliable way. 
This method was presented and described in detail in [9], where the tool hping 
to perform this scan can be downloaded. This is another reason to take care and 
log all incoming and outgoing connections to an apparently harmless device. 
Conclusions 
Printers are not unique, in the sense that there are several intelligent peripherals 
and related software considered harmless with serious security vulnerabilities: 
for example, a vulnerability for the widely use Palm PDA which allows a 
Denial of Service attack over any computer running the Hotsync Manager 
Utility was discovered just months ago. Anyway, in this paper we have 
concentrated on networked printers since, at present, they mean the highest level 
of risk. 
As we have shown, there should be no doubt about the security problem that 
networked printers represent. Apart from the previously seen vulnerabilities, it 
should be clear that many other security holes exist @om these and other 
manufictures) and have not been discovered yet. Printers are not inoffensive: 
networked printers must be taken into account as a very serious security risk, 
and thus must be updated and scanned regularly searching for vulnerabilities 
that could affect the proper working of the information system. 
The best way of motivating manufacturers on improving the security of their 
products is customers demanding this security level. Administrators play an 
important role in this security improvement, because only if printers and the rest 
of devices are considered a potential risk, it will be possible that their security 
features get better. 
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